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Abstract
Building on recent work in occupational safety, the present research investigated the relationship between leader-member 
exchange (LMX) and in-role safety behavior. We predicted that higher quality LMX may produce employees’ stronger 
motivation for reciprocity, which may lead to not only more extra-role safety behavior [1], but also more in-role safety behavior. 
Data were collected among work units in a power supplying company in China. Our findings indicated a moderating effect of 
safety climate on the hypothesized relationship between LMX and safety behavior, so that LMX was positively associated with 
safety behavior when safety climate was high, while it was negatively associated with safety behavior when safety climate was 
low. Implications of our findings for social exchange theory and safety management were discussed.
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1. Main text 
Workplace accidents cause great amount of life and property loss every year. For example, 3639 accidents led to 
6027 deaths in coal mining industry alone in China in 2004. Although safety used to be regarded as only an 
engineering problem, in recent years many studies found the important role of organizational and managerial factors 
in safety management and accident prevention. And the research interests have extended from organizational 
climate [2,3,4,5], leadership [6,7,8.9], communication [10,11], motivation [12], personality [13] and other organizational 
constructs. 
It was thought that the fundamental question in safety management is the balance between safety and 
productivity. Since the seminal work of Woodworth’s study, the two basic aspects of behavior, speed and accuracy, 
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have been studied in basic and applied settings, and negative association was found between these two aspects in 
many studies [14,15,16]. The negative relation indicates a tradeoff between speed and accuracy in many tasks 
conducted by humans. We should acknowledge that productivity and safety are much broader concept than speed 
and accuracy, such as that productivity can be driven by factors other than speed of work and safety may involve 
discretion and intelligence other than compliance to the rules. However, the trade-off between speed and accuracy 
are still very important aspects for productivity and safety performance respectively in many job categories. It is not 
hard to imagine that an employee who follows the rules and regulations strictly is more likely to perform his or her 
job with higher accuracy and therefore it may lead to less probability for mistakes and accidents, and that an 
employee who choose accomplish large amount of work more quickly usually has to take shortcuts and ignore some 
regulations and thus lead to higher productivity but also lower accuracy and higher probability of accidents. It is true 
that this trade-off may not be constant in different organizational settings and different timing of the task. For 
example, a curvilinear relationship has been found between safety and level of completion of the project [17,18]. But 
in most situations, the trade-off between safety and productivity can be easily traced. For example, it was also found 
that pay-by-performance systems increased productivity while also increased injury rates in organizations [18]. 
The balance for safety and productivity is not at all symmetric. Actually, quite a few studies have indicated that 
practitioners usually put more weight on productivity at the cost of loss in safety. Zohar found that it is production 
instead of safety that emphasized in everyday work practice, while safety usually was emphasized only “on the 
mouth” [19] (in written regulations). Pate-Cornell also found that managers usually emphasize productivity over 
safety due to job evaluation procedures, which was a major reason for poor safety record in many organizations [20]. 
In a recent experimental study, researchers found that people usually make predictions that upper management's 
final layoff decisions would result in safe workers being laid off to a greater extent than productive workers [21]. 
It will be very helpful to understand the underlying reasons for the asymmetry between safety and productivity 
in organizations. And previous studies have put much effort to examine the reasons for de-emphasis on safety in 
practice [19]. The present study will investigate what could be the consequence, under the common practice of 
asymmetrically emphasis on productivity over safety, from the perspective of social exchange between supervisor 
and subordinates. The social interaction between supervisor and subordinates is among the most important daily 
interactions for most jobs in organizations [22]. We thought employees’ safety behavior could be considered as a kind 
of reciprocal consequence responding to positive social exchange to the management. And examination of safety 
behavior from the perspective of social exchange can provide new understanding towards the safety management. 
1.1. Leader-member exchanges and safety behavior
According to the social exchange theory, people will perceive obligation to reciprocate when they receive good-
intended treatments in social interactions. In organizations, employees are more likely to fulfill the management’s 
expectations for them when they felt liking, admiration and respect from the management. Hence subordinates in 
high-quality of leader-member exchange may feel obligation to reciprocate their supervisors. 
Safety behaviors are likely avenues for reciprocation. Although formal regulations usually put some basic 
requirement on safety, employees often choose to ignore safety regulations and take shortcuts to increase 
productivity for more personal gains, as many studies have found [19,20,23]. In many cases, violations of safety 
regulations will not lead to direct, immediate loss, while strict compliance to these regulations can be perceived to 
draw back the pace of work. In modern world filled competition in business, running ahead before the competitors is 
of great value. The tight schedule and timetable of project and task in most organizations usually make it worse for 
both the management and employees to choose productivity over safety in practice. Therefore, it may not be totally 
surprising that in many organizations employees consider compliance to safety regulations was an extra burden on 
them [23]. A case study conducted in coal mining industry (Paul & Maiti, 2007) showed that both the management 
board and miners regard production as their major task, while safety consideration was something “extra” [24]. 
Actually safety requirement was not regarded as core aspect for performance evaluation as long as no trouble was 
caused in many situations. When safety behavior is considered an “extra” expectation, it can be conceived that 
subordinate may take it as reciprocal “return” to pay back for high-quality relationship with their supervisors, 
because employees do not consider safety compliance has much to do with them and safety behavior will benefit 
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much more for their supervisor and the organization than for themselves. Therefore, we made the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: LMX will be positively associated with employees’ safety behavior. 
Though previous work which linked the quality of social exchange to safety management investigated the 
relationships both between LMX and safety communication [25], and between LMX and citizenship behavior on 
safety [1], to the best of our knowledge no studies investigate the effect of LMX on in-role safety behaviors. 
Hofmann’s study examined the “extra-role” safety behaviors (safety citizenship behaviors) but did not include 
common in-role behaviors. And according to our analysis, many “in-role” safety behaviors may be perceived as 
“extra-role” subjectively by employees. Hence, our study will fill the gap by examining the LMX’s effect on in-role 
safety behaviors. 
1.2. The moderating effect of safety climate
The organization or work unit’s valued behaviors may provide direction for the subordinates’ reciprocation from 
high quality LMX [26]. Subordinates can sense and figure out what are the valued behaviors in their organization or 
work units. For example, if employees find out that safety is not only emphasized in formal policies, but also in 
daily practice, they may be more likely to engage in behaviors complying to safety regulations and improving safety 
performance when they are willing to do something benefit for their supervisor or organization. Therefore, safety 
behavior could also be function of the employees’ perception of on safety management. Because in most modern 
organizations where safe manufacturing is under concern, it is more common than not that individual employees 
work together in work units, it is the shared perception emerged from mutual interaction and communication that 
may be most influential for the behaviors. The notion of shared perception on valued perception is just what 
researchers defined as “organization climate”, which was “shared perception of the way things are around here” and 
“shared perceptions of the policies, practices, and procedures that are rewarded, supported, and expected in that 
organization” [27]. 
Since organizations have multiple climates and different climates are associated with different aspect of 
functions, such as climate for safety [28], service [29] and innovation [30], it is more meaningful to focus on the 
particular type of climate which may be relevant to the research interest. In the present study we will examine the 
climate for safety emerged in work groups. Although usually most organization with some level of risky working 
environment will emphasize safety at least to some minimal degree, empirical evidence indicated that work groups 
within an organization vary significantly in the extent to which safety behaviors are valued and rewarded [1]. A 
recent study showed that supervisor’s practice on safety was related to both the level and strength of safety 
climate [31]. Therefore, even if the policies and regulations remain constant for employees across the organization, 
significant variance may still be there between different work groups because of the differences in supervising 
practice between work groups. 
When safety climates in work groups vary significantly, we may expect that the degrees to which employees 
value the safety behaviors are quite different between different work groups. From the perspective of social 
exchange, in those work groups with positive safety climate, employees are more likely to take safety behaviors as 
valued reciprocation for the high quality of social exchange which they feel. However, when safety climate in work 
group is weak, employees are less likely to value safety behaviors as legitimate reciprocation for the implied 
obligation resulting from high quality social exchange. Therefore, we draw the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Safety climate will moderate the relationship between LMX and safety behavior, in that when 
safety climate is high, the positive association between LMX and safety behavior will be stronger than when safety 
climate is low.
According to the methodological suggestions outlined by Leung and van de Vijver [32], if the research logic could 
be confirmed by different methods, predictions or context, we could put more confidence on the conclusion. We 
may expect that safety behavior may be a function of many factors and the measurement of it may contain too much 
“noise”. Therefore we included the construct of “safety motivation” as additional dependent measurement, 
following the strategy “predictive consilience” [32]. The motivation measurement may be more proximal to the 
consideration for social exchanges. And if similar result pattern could be found in safety motivation, like that of 
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safety behavior, our reasoning on social exchange and safety climate could be more persuasive. In similar vein of 
safety behavior, we draw the following conclusion.
Hypothesis 3a: LMX will be positively associated with employees’ safety motivation.
Hypothesis 3b: Safety climate will moderate the relationship between LMX and safety motivation, in that when 
safety climate is high, the positive association between LMX and safety motivation will be stronger than when safety 
climate is low.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The data was collected in a large state-owned power supplying company in China. The company provides power 
supply service for a whole province in eastern China and safety performance is one of the major concerns of its 
formal evaluation system because of the risky working environment faced by front-line employees including 
equipment maintenance, repairing, power lines checking and so on. We handed out questionnaires to 35 work units 
and 31 were returned, with a return rate of 88.6%. A scrutiny of the data identified data from four groups was 
invalid with too many incomplete questionnaires. We identified data of supervisors of work units and exclude them 
from data analysis. The final sample included 178 participants from 31 work units. Among the final sample, 82.6% 
participants were males and 16.3% were females. 28.1% were in an age of 20-29, 59.6% were in 30-39 and 12.4% 
were over 40. For the work experience, 28.6% worked less than three year in the company, 60.7% worked in the 
company for over four years but not more than ten years, and 10.7% over ten years. For education level, 52.8% 
attended a professional school and 28.1% received a college degree. 
2.2. Measures
LMX was measured by the scale of Graen and Uhl-Bien’s study [22]. The scale consisted of seven items on 5-
point scale ranging from 1 (strong disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We adapted the format of the scale by changing 
the questions in original scale into statements so that it is consistent with the rest of other measures in tables. The 
sample items were “you know where you stand with your leader and your leader is satisfied with what you do” and 
“your leader understands your job problems and needs”. The alpha coefficient was .96. 
Safety climate was measured by the 16 item scale used in Zohar and Luria’s study [5]. The items covered a range 
of interactions between supervisor and subordinates where the supervisor indicates the priority of safety versus 
competing goal like productivity and catching the schedule. Items were rated on 5-point scales. Sample items were 
“my direct supervisor makes sure that we all get the equipment needed to do the job safely” and “my direct 
supervisor frequently check to see if we are all obeying the safety rules”. Zohar and Luria’s study showed the items 
in the scale can be explained by a global factor [5]. We aggregated the individual data into work group construct. To 
check the appropriateness of the aggregation, we calculated rWG, which represents the inter-rater agreement of the 
measure. The value was .72. And we also calculated ICC(1) and ICC(2), the values were .65 and .12 respectively. 
And the alpha coefficient for the scale on individual data level was 0.77. 
Safety behavior was measured by the scale from Neal and Griffin’s study [12]. Though we had planned to develop 
a scale specific for the power supplying company and thought it may be more informative, we found the variance of 
the job content between different functional work units made it impossible to establish a unified scale for all in 
reasonable length. Hence we decided to use the Neal and Griffin’s scale because its items covered most frequent 
safety behaviors for most job categories. The scale consisted of six items and it was used to measure two categories 
of safety behavior, safety compliance and safety participation [12]. Sample items were “I use all necessary safety 
equipment to do my job” (safety compliance) and “I put in extra effort to improve safety of the workplace” (safety 
participation). However, an exploratory factor analysis on our data indicated that the six items actually loaded into 
one global factor and that many large cross-factor loadings appeared if we set two factors for the six items. 
Therefore, we merge these two parts into one measurement on safety behaviors. It was rated on 5-point scale. The 
alpha coefficient of the scale was 0.92. 
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Safety motivation was also measured by scale from Neal and Griffin’s study [12]. The scale consisted of three 
items and it was rated on 5-point scale. A sample item was “I feel it worthwhile to put in effort to maintain or 
improve my personal safety”. The alpha coefficient of the scale was .82. 
3. Results
Means, Standard deviations and inter-correlations of study variables were listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of study variables.
Note. * p<.05; ** p<.01; a Values were on individual level. Entries in diagonal 
were alpha coefficients. 
To test the common method variance [33], confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to test the distinctness of 
the constructs. A four-factor model with items loaded on the corresponding constructs was evaluated, and the model 
fit wDVJRRGȤ GI ȤGI &), ,), 506($ ,QFRQWUDVWDRQHIDFWRUPRGHO
ZLWKDOOWKHLWHPVORDGHGRQDVLQJOHIDFWRU\LHOGHGDSRRUILWȤ GI ȤGI &), 11), 
506($ ǻȤ ǻGI p < .001). These results confirmed discriminant validity for measures. 
Because the data was multilevel in nature, the ordinary regression methods cannot be used because it may 
underestimate the standard errors of variables and lead to wrong spurious conclusion [34]. The appropriate analytical 
method was Hierarchical Linear Modeling [34]. 
Table 2. Results of Hierarchical Linear Modelling.
safety behavior safety motivation
Level 1
1. gender -.03  (.11) -.14  (.17)
2. age -.01  (.05) -.02  (.12)
3. tenure .06†  (.03) -.02  (.04)
4. education -.03  (.06) -.08  (.09)
5. LMX .01   (.07) .02  (.07)
Level 2
On intercept
6. safety climate .56†  (.31) .01  (.07)
On slope
6. safety climate 1.45* (.28) .90* (.29)
Note. † p <.10; * p <.05. Level 1 refers to individual level and level 2 refers to group level.
M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Safety behaviors 3.70 1.02 (.92)
2. Safety motivation 3.55 0.98 .59** (.82)
3. LMX 2.90 1.32 -.07 .01 (.96)
4. Safety climate a 3.41 0.51 .25* .34** 0.11 (.77)
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Fig. 1. Moderating effect of safety climate on relationship between LMX and safety behavior.
Fig. 2. Moderating effect of safety climate on relationship between LMX and safety motivation.
We first enter the controls and LMX on regression to safety behavior and safety motivation respectively on 
individual level, and then we enter safety climate in group level on regression to the intercept and slope of the 
individual level regression by LMX, in order to test the cross-level moderating effect.
The summary of the results were provided in Table 2. As we can see for both safety behavior and safety 
motivation, LMX showed no significant effects. Therefore hypothesis 1 and 3a were not supported. But the cross-
level moderating effects were significant for both safety behavior (B=1.45, p<.05) and safety motivation (B=0.89, 
p<.05), therefore, hypothesis 2 and 3b were supported. 
We plot the interaction effect according to suggestions of Aiken and West [35], as illustrated in Figure 3 and 4. In 
line with the hypothesis 2 and 3b, when safety climate was high, LMX showed a positive relationship with safety 
behavior and safety motivation. However, when safety climate is low, the relationships were negative. 
4. Discussion
To our surprise, our findings indicated that LMX showed no significant effect on safety behaviors; neither did it 
on safety motivation. However, consistent with our hypothesis, safety climate showed a significant moderating 
effect on both the relationship between LMX and safety behaviors, and between LMX and safety motivation. When 
the safety climate was strong, high quality of LMX may lead to more safety behavior. But when safety climate was 
weak, high quality of LMX may lead to less safety behavior. The result pattern was exactly the same for safety 
motivation. 
Some previous studies found positive association between LMX and favored job outcomes [26,36]. In safety field, 
LMX was found to be positively correlated with safety communication, commitment [25] and extra-role safety 
behaviors [1]. However, the present study failed to find the hypothesized relationship between LMX and safety 
behaviors. A possible conjecture is that high quality of LMX does not necessarily bring about high level of safety 
concern. LMX only signal the tight bond and high quality of social interaction between supervisor and subordinate. 
Such reciprocate, high quality social exchange put implied obligation on the subordinates when they perceive high 
level of LMX. However, the obligation may lead to various kinds of behavior which the subordinates think might 
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benefit and re-pay for what they have received from the high quality social exchange. High LMX provide no signal 
for direction of reciprocal behaviors. Employees in high LMX may take actions to the expectation by the strong 
influence of group shared perception, that is, the safety climate. 
Therefore, safety climate determine play a role like a rudder, determining the direction of output of implied 
obligation resulting from the high quality of social exchange. We know that in many situations safety and 
productivity may usually in trade-off relations, or at least perceived to be so by most employees [19,23]. Safety climate 
vary between organizations and work groups. In the present study, some work groups had a good level safety 
climate while some had poor climate for safety. Safety climate is actual “the way things are around here”, but not 
those things on the lips like formal policies and regulations in some organizations. So safety climate provide the real 
signal the extent to which safety versus other competitive goals like productivity is on the prior concerns. Zohar and 
Luria found that safety climate may be actually a consequence of supervisory practices [31]. Therefore employees in 
the group can perceive what kinds of behaviors are more valued by the supervisor and peers. And they will take 
actions according to their perception of valued outcomes to benefit the work group when they enjoy a high quality 
of social exchange. When the safety climate is prone to favor safety more versus other competitive goals, employees 
are more likely to take more actions to maintain or improve safety performance, like compliance to the rules or 
actively participation in safety activities if they feel it necessary to do something good for their group and supervisor 
resulting from high quality of social exchange. However, when the safety climate is poor, employees who have high 
quality of social exchange may figure out that other competitive goals (usually productivity) may be more important 
and thereafter they may take more shortcuts to catch on the schedule or lead to higher yielding in quantity at the cost 
of safety in order to meet the implied obligation and benefit their group and supervisor. Of course, the analysis 
above is speculative and future research will make further investigation to test the reasoning. 
We think the present research may have two major implications for theory development. First, the present 
research investigates LMX’s effect on in-role safety behaviors and fills the gap of literature for the relationship 
between LMX and in-role safety behaviors. Second, safety climate moderates the relationship between LMX and 
safety behavior. Actually, our finding indicated that safety climate determine the direction of LMX’s effect on safety 
behavior. LMX is typically viewed as an antecedent for favored work outcomes. However, the present study 
indicated it might be detrimental in some situations for safety management. Future study will scrutinize the 
interesting relationship and examine our speculative reasoning. And we think the practical implications of this study 
may also rest on two points. First, the high quality of social exchange between supervisor and group members may 
both be blessing and curse for safety management. And managers may need to keep in mind that high quality social 
exchange of work groups or units sometimes may be detrimental. Second, to form and maintain a good climate for 
safety is very important for safety performance. Good safety climate combined with high quality of social 
interactions can be more effective to enhance the safety management. 
The present research has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, our study variables 
are based on self-report, raising the issue of common method variance. However, a cross-level design may be 
helpful to offset the potential bias. The moderator, safety climate, is an aggregated, group level variable. And the 
moderating effect is a cross-level one. Second, our sample is a convenience sample, and the generalizability of the 
results cannot be ascertained. A related issue is that our results were obtained in China where productivity is more 
emphasized in practice over safety in many manufacturing industries according to our case observation. The future 
study should test the generalizability of our findings in other settings where safety is commonly on prior concern.
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